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ABSTRACT: Puerto Rico is experiencing a severe economic and social crisis. The crisis
conditions began emerging in the late 1990s after the collapse of a development model
dependent on U.S. corporate handouts. The island is now saddled with an overwhelming and
unpayable level of public debt. Various proposals for solving the crisis are now being fought
over by the Puerto Rican government, its creditors, and the Financial Oversight Board
established by the U.S. Congress in 2016 to manage the crisis. But the predominant idea
guiding these discussions is an austerity agenda. Austerity policies in Puerto Rico now will
deepen the crisis since it will lead to declining incomes, private spending and business sales, and
a diminishing tax base for servicing debt. We develop a “green growth” program for Puerto
Rico as an alternative to austerity. In its essentials, our green growth plan consists of two
elements: large-scale annual investments in both energy efficiency and clean renewable energy.
Through these investments, low-cost, domestically-produced clean energy will steadily supplant
imported fossil fuels, with the target being that by 2050, clean energy sources will have replaced
fossil fuels entirely in Puerto Rico. This green growth program is capable of delivering much
lower energy costs on the island, while also steadily reducing, and finally eliminating altogether,
its dependence on fossil fuel imports. The green growth program will also be a major new
source of job opportunities and will create widespread opportunities for small-scale ownership
forms to flourish within the island’s energy sector. Major debt write-downs will be necessary to
enable the green growth program to move forward at a significant scale.
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Puerto Rico is experiencing a severe economic and social crisis. The crisis conditions
began emerging in the late 1990s after the collapse of a development model dependent on U.S.
corporate handouts. The demise of this model then led to a relentless rise in public borrowing by
the Commonwealth and its numerous public and semi-public agencies. The island is now
saddled with an overwhelming and unpayable level of public debt.
According to the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico’s own data, overall
economic activity began falling in mid-2005—notably, more than two years before the onset of
the global financial crisis—and presently is 23 percent below the 2005 peak. The labor force
participation rate has fallen from 47.4 percent at the beginning of 2008 to 39.4 percent in mid2017, and the number of people employed has fallen by 10 percent. Puerto Rico’s population
has dropped from 3.8 million in 2006 to 3.4 million at present, as economic opportunities on the
island evaporate.
Meanwhile, the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities owe approximately $74 billion
in debt—about 74 percent of GDP—with debt servicing costs ranging between $3.5 and $3.8
billion between 2017 – 19. Of that total, about $47 billion owned by public corporations and
other quasi-government entities. Beyond these figures are $49 billion in public sector pension
liabilities, of which only about 1.6 percent were funded as of mid-2015. 1
Various proposals for solving the crisis are now being fought over by the Puerto Rican
government, its creditors, and the Financial Oversight Board established by the U.S. Congress in
2016 to manage the crisis. But thus far, nearly everything being proposed in these discussions
promises to only make conditions worse. This is because the proposals under discussion are
based on the false premise that what Puerto Rico needs now is austerity. Austerity for Puerto
Rico today specifically entails sharp cuts in government spending, including in the areas of
health care, education as well as the overall number of jobs and the pay levels for public
employees. This is while 20 percent of employed workers now hold government jobs.
In fact, this austerity plan for Puerto Rico will deepen the crisis since, as with all such
austerity programs, it will lead to declining incomes, private spending and business sales, and
thereby, a diminishing tax base for servicing debt. Even the Puerto Rican government’s own
analysis, presented in their March 2017 “Fiscal Plan” that was approved by the Oversight Board,
projects further economic contraction through 2024.
The Fiscal Plan does also include a “structural reform” program for restoring economic
growth to the island that offers at least a glimmer of possibility. The structural reform program
1

See Oversight Board (2017), pp. 9-10.
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focuses initially on a 3-year, $5 billion program in public/private partnership investments, with
the new investment areas including energy (43 percent), transportation (22 percent), waste
management (20 percent), water management (8 percent) and social infrastructure (7 percent).
Yet even this proposal suffers from two fundamental flaws. The first is straightforward:
few private investors will want to commit long-term to an economy that has failed to grow for
nearly 20 years and where policymakers are actively implementing austerity policies that will
squeeze the economy further. But even if the government is able to escape from its current
austerity trap, its proposed structural reform program still needs to be developed much more
carefully before anyone can be confident that it isn’t simply a new vehicle for channeling
financial giveaways to U.S. corporations.
On the positive side, with Puerto Rico’s energy infrastructure being identified as the
single most important area for targeted investments, the Fiscal Plan recognizes that the island’s
existing energy system is dysfunctional, acting as a major drag on competitiveness and growth.
Thus, electricity prices for industrial consumers are three times higher than those in the U.S.
mainland. Puerto Rico also imports all of its energy supply, with these imports constituting an
outflow of aggregate demand ranging between about 4-6 percent of GDP most years.
We propose to build from the government’s structural reform proposal, to develop a
“green growth” program for Puerto Rico. Like the government’s own proposal, our green
growth plan is designed to serve as a framework for the structural transformation of Puerto
Rico’s economy. In its essentials, our green growth plan consists of only two simple elements:
large-scale annual investments in both energy efficiency and clean renewable energy. Through
these investments, low-cost, domestically-produced clean energy will steadily supplant imported
fossil fuels, with the target being that by 2050, clean energy sources will have replaced fossil
fuels entirely in Puerto Rico.
Most of the specific areas for development targeted in the government’s structural reform
program can be effectively integrated into this green growth framework. Transforming the
island’s energy infrastructure is clearly the single most important priority. But the transportation
system can also be overhauled within the green growth project through expanding public transit
and subsidizing the local market for high-efficiency private vehicles, including hybrids and
electric cars. Waste management can be utilized for generating clean sources of bioenergy.
Incorporating small-scale hydro power projects into the island’s water management system can
produce cheap electricity.
Overall, this green growth program is capable of delivering much lower energy costs on
the island, while also steadily reducing, and finally eliminating altogether, its dependence on
fossil fuel imports. The green growth program will also be a major new source of job
opportunities and will create widespread opportunities for small-scale ownership forms to
flourish within the island’s energy sector.
A critical component of the green growth plan, as we discuss below, will be a carbon tax.
This will concurrently discourage the consumption of fossil fuel energy through higher retail
prices, while also generating a level of tax revenues that would be adequate to, at once, finance
2
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the long-term investment program, provide tax rebates for lower-income households, and still
have significant funds available for servicing the public sector’s debt. Finally, the green growth
program will enable Puerto Rico to make a positive, if modest, contribution to reducing global
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and fighting climate change. This will add luster to Puerto
Rico’s reputation as a beautiful tourist destination—with tourism being one of the island’s
largest industries.
Yet despite all these positive benefits, it is still the case that, as with the government’s
own structural reform proposals, this green growth program cannot successfully launch under
austerity conditions. Major debt write-downs will be necessary to enable the green growth
program to move forward at a significant scale. To understand the justification for major debt
write-downs, it will be useful to review how Puerto Rico got into its debt trap and fiscal crisis in
the first place.
Origins of the Debt Crisis
Puerto Rico’s current debt crisis can be traced to the ending of a major tax subsidy for
U.S. business corporations that had been operating since 1976. This subsidy, known as IRS
Section 936, exempted from U.S. federal taxation any profits earned in Puerto Rico. Investments
into Puerto Rico by U.S. firms increased sharply as a result of this policy. Thus, as of 1974, U.S.
corporate direct investment on the island was at 80 percent of GDP. 2 Four years later,
subsequent to the passage of Section 936, that figure jumped to 97 percent of GDP. 3 The
primary firms taking advantage of the 936 subsidy were capital-intensive high tech U.S.
manufacturers, in particular such pharmaceutical giants as Abbott Laboratories, Pzifer, and
Merck. 4 These companies along with the rest of the pharmaceutical sector received about half
the tax benefits of the subsidy over the years 1985-1989. 5 The subsidy saved U.S. businesses an
average of about $2.5 billion (constant dollars) per year throughout the 1980s. This equaled
about 12 percent of Puerto Rican GDP over these years and was sufficient, for example, to fully
cover the payroll costs of these businesses in 1989.
The Section 936 program clearly provided a huge benefit to the investing corporations.
It was also a major engine of the island’s economic growth. Over the 30 years 1976 – 2006, that
the subsidy was in place, Puerto Rico’s GDP growth averaged 3.5 percent per year. There were
only three years—1982, 1983 and 2006—of negative GDP growth during the years that 936
operated.
It is critical to recognize that the benefits from economic growth that did occur under 936
were heavily skewed in favor of U.S. corporations as opposed to the local Puerto Rican economy
or its people. Godoy explains:

2

See Lubeck (1976), pg. 53.
See Ayala & Bernabe (2007), pg. 269.
4
See U.S. Department of the Treasury (1978) for a further listing of companies which benefitted from
Section 936.
5
See Government Accountability Office (1993).
3
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Since 1965, the 936 tax incentive did little for the people of Puerto Rico but lots
for mainland U.S. corporations. Most eye-opening is the mega difference between
Puerto Rican GDP and GNP. The growth of GNP is a much better measure of the
improvement of the Puerto Rican economy, but the economic gains of U.S.
corporations have been confused with gains for the island. For example, GNP fell
to 76 percent of GDP in 1980, 68 percent in 1990, 67 percent in 2000, and 66
percent in 2010. To put these figures in some perspective, in 2004, for only 15
countries was GNP less than 90 percent of GDP, and for only 2 was the GNPGDP ratio less than 70 percent--Puerto Rico at 67 percent and Equatorial Guinea
at 30 percent. The benefits of 936 flowed to shareholders and not Puerto Rican
residents (2016, p. 1).
But Puerto Rico began losing even this lop-sided growth model with the phase-out of 936
beginning in in 1996 under President Bill Clinton, and continued through 2006. The Clinton
Administration argued for the phase-out as a measure to reduce the U.S. fiscal deficit. It was
estimated that the phase-out would save the U.S. Treasury $10 billion over 10 years, or roughly
$1 billion per year. In 1996, the federal budget was $1.95 trillion, and the fiscal deficit was
$144 billion. Abolishing 936 could obviously have only a trivial impact on the U.S. federal
budget one way or another. But because Puerto Rico had become dependent on U.S.
investments as its growth engine, the phase out had a devastating effect on the Puerto Rican
economy.
Thus, from 2007 – 2016, Puerto Rico’s average annual growth rate was -1.1 percent. On
a year-by-year basis, Puerto Rico experienced only one year of positive growth over this period,
in 2012, and that year growth, at 0.03 percent, only barely reached positive territory. It is true
that the years since the ending of 936, starting in 2007, coincided with the global financial crisis,
Great Recession, and weak recovery. However, Puerto Rico’s growth performance since 2007
has been weaker than even the worst performing states in the U.S. mainland. The two most
sluggish U.S. state economies, Connecticut and Nevada, averaged an annual growth rate of -0.75
percent and -0.65 percent respectively over the same period. Small countries in the Caribbean
grew at a positive average rate of 0.5 percent over these years. In Europe, the only country that
compares with Puerto Rico in terms of growth performance is Greece, where its debt crisis and
punishing austerity program has delivered an average growth rate of -2.6 percent during this
period.
Not surprisingly, the most directly hit sector in Puerto Rico due to the Section 936
phase out was manufacturing. From 2001-07, Puerto Rico had an average of 3,000
manufacturing establishments. By 2012, that number had dropped to 2,000—i.e. a
decline of one-third within a period of five years after the 936 phase-out. Manufacturing
employment fell commensurately, from an average of 150,000 between 1990 – 97 to less
than 74,000 as of 2015.
The loss of U.S. manufacturers also created a direct hit to Puerto Rico’s fiscal conditions.
This is because while 936 was still in effect, the island instituted a 10 percent repatriation tax
known as the tollgate tax. Since much of the income generated on the island was repatriated
back to the U.S., the tollgate tax provided a major source of government revenue. As of 1994,
4
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the tollgate tax generated $225 million, or 5 percent of the Commonwealth’s general revenue
funds. As of 2015, the tollgate tax had dwindled down to $4 million.
It is within this context that the Puerto Rican public sector began to increase its reliance
on debt. Thus, as of 1997, the year that the Section 936 phase-out began, total public debt,
including that of the Commonwealth itself as well as the various public and quasi-public
corporations, of the was at 60.3 percent of GNP. That figure rose during the phase-out period
through 2006, to 70.4 percent. From 2007 – 2015, the public debt/GNP ratio rose sharply,
peaking in 2015 at 95.1% percent. 6
But more significant than the rising debt level per se has been the interest obligations on
the overall debt level. According to the Commonwealth’s most recently released financial
statement (2014), its level of debt servicing had reached fully 5 percent of the island’s GDP and
23 percent of total expenditures. It is within this framework that Puerto Rico’s current debt
obligations are clearly unpayable.
The single largest group holding Puerto Rican bonds are U.S. hedge funds, with their
holdings estimated to be between 25 – 50 percent of all outstanding debt. As Merling et al.
(2017) write:
In 2014, hedge funds began to buy up debt at a steep discount on the secondary as
well as on the primary market….This buying spree continued through late 2014
and into 2015….Among this group of hedge funds is the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto
Rico’s General Obligation Bondholders, which aggressively offered to buy more
bonds as Puerto Rico’s access to credit markets deteriorated. The investors
lobbied against Puerto Rico’s access to bankruptcy proceedings and promoted
austerity policies as the crisis deepened in 2015 and 2016, (2017, pp. 16-17).
In short, these U.S. hedge funds understood full well that they were buying into a
high-risk proposition. This is precisely why they were able to purchase the outstanding
loans on the secondary market at steep discounts.
Energy as Structural Program
The severity of Puerto Rico’s structural problems created by its current energy
system can be understood clearly by considering evidence on both comparative energy
prices between the island and the U.S. mainland as well as the island’s trade deficit in
energy.
Energy prices. Table 1 presents current comparative figures on energy prices.
As we see first, the price differences are modest in the case of gasoline. Average retail
6

The comparable ratio is lower when GDP, as opposed to GNP, is the denominator, following from our
discussion above on the fact of Puerto Rico’s GNP having grown much more slowly than GDP during the
936 period. The comparable ratios when GDP is in the denominator are: 40.5 percent in 1997, 46.2
percent in 2006 and 64.2 percent in 2015.
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gasoline prices in San Juan in 2017, at $2.50 per gallon, are only about 4 percent higher
than the average U.S. price.
TABLE 1 BELONGS HERE
However, with electricity, prices in Puerto Rico are 58 percent higher for
residential consumers, 113 percent higher for commercial users, and 275 percent higher
for industry. It is clear how these price differentials, especially those for commercial and
industrial consumers, are capable of greatly weakening Puerto Rico’s competitiveness.
This problem becomes more dramatic still when considering the opportunities that
are available to the island through investing to create large-scale renewable energy
resources. The lower panel of Table 1 shows the most recent figures on electricity prices
from clean renewable energy sources, as reported by the U.S. Energy Information
Agency (EIA). The EIA figures are projections of renewable electricity prices for U.S.based projects beginning operations in 2022. As we see, these prices are 5.6 cents per
kilowatt hour (kWh) for onshore wind, 7.4 cents for solar, and 4.4 cents for geothermal. 7
The current electricity prices in Puerto Rico range between 3 – 4 times higher than these
figures. It is therefore apparent that advancing a green growth strategy aiming to achieve
100 percent renewable energy supply represents a major opportunity to both lower the
cost of living for households and business competitiveness.
Energy trade deficit. Table 2 shows figures on Puerto Rico’s trade deficit in
energy, providing the most recent available full set of figures for 2011 – 2015. As we
see, the trade deficit over these five years is very large, ranging between 3.6 and 6.3
percent of the island’s GDP. That is, Puerto Rico is shipping out, roughly, between 4 – 6
percent of its national income to purchase imported energy. With a decently functioning
domestic energy system, these are resources that could be channeled into promoting
domestic investments, expanding job opportunities and raising living standards for Puerto
Rico’s residents. This level of imports might be justifiable if it were delivering low-cost
energy to the island. But, as we have seen, the opposite is the case: Puerto Rico is
draining its national income to purchase imported energy, while residential, commercial,
and industrial consumers are all paying exorbitant electricity prices.
TABLE 2 BELONGS HERE
Basic Assumptions of Green Growth Program

7

These price figures are from the April 2017 publication of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, Levelized
Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2017:
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf. It is also notable that the EIA’s cost
estimates for 2022 have fallen by more than half relative to their 2012 estimates for plants entering service
in 2017. Thus, for plants entering service in 2017, the EIA had projected in 2012 that average prices
would be 9.6 cents per kWh for onshore wind, 15.3 cents for solar PV, and 9.8 cents for geothermal (see
Pollin et al. 2014, p. 126-27).
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As we see in Table 3, as of the most recent 2015 data, GDP in Puerto Rico was $103
billion, equal to about $30,000 per capita. We assume that GDP will remain flat through 2020,
the first year of the green growth program. From 2020 – 2050, we then assume that GDP grows
at an average rate of 2 percent per year. Of course, this growth rate represents a major
improvement over the negative growth that the island has experienced over the past decade. But
it is also well below the 3.2 percent average growth rate that was maintained between 1995 –
2005. 8
TABLE 3 BELONGS HERE
With GDP at $103 billion, total energy consumption in Puerto Rico from all sources
equals 0.38 quadrillion British Thermal Units (Q-BTUs) 9 and CO2 emissions are at 28 million
metric tons. 10 The aim of the green growth program is to support a healthy rate of long-term
economic growth while energy efficiency investments and clean renewable energy replace fossil
fuel consumption, and CO2 emissions fall steadily towards the zero emissions goal by 2050.
In rows 7 and 8 of Table 3, we present our assumptions as to the average costs of
achieving one Q-BTU of energy savings through efficiency investments and of building one QBTU of clean renewable energy supply. As we see, the assumptions we use are that are that
achieving 1 Q-BTU of savings will cost an average of $20 billion, and that expanding the supply
of clean renewable energy will be $125 billion. The energy efficiency investments include the
areas of building retrofits, public transportation, industrial efficiency and electrical grid
upgrades. The renewable energy investments include wind, solar, geothermal, small-scale hydro
and low-emissions bioenergy.
These cost estimates are derived from a range of sources examining these issues,
including the World Bank, McKinsey and Company, the U.S. Energy Information Agency, the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the International Renewable Energy Agency. The 2015
study Global Green Growth (Pollin et al. 2015) presents a full discussion of these estimates for a
range of countries. The figures that we are applying to Puerto Rico are the same as those Pollin
et al. applied for the South Korean economy in the 2015 study. These cost figures are higher
than those that we had assumed for Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa in the 2015 study.
Energy Supply and Demand with Clean Energy Investments
8

The green growth program can also be implemented successfully within a more slowly growing economy.
Indeed, the challenges of building a 100 percent clean energy infrastructure are greater in many ways under
more rapid economic growth conditions, since this entails keeping up energy efficiency and renewable
energy investments with the expansion of energy demand resulting from growth. One key point in
considering a green growth program within the context of a modestly healthy growth trajectory is to show
that reducing, then eliminating altogether, the demand for fossil fuel energy supply is fully compatible with
economic growth.
9
BTUs are the most convenient unit in which to measure energy, since they are a measure that can be
readily applied across all energy sources. For purposes of scaling, burning a wood match to its end
generates about 1 BTU of energy. As of 2016, the U.S. economy consumed a bit less than 100 Q-BTUs of
energy and the global economy consumed about 600 Q-BTUs.
10
Hereafter we drop the word “metric” in referring to tons. All figures reported in “tons” throughout the
paper refer to metric tons.
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In Table 4, we present figures on energy supply and demand over the 2020 – 2050 period,
starting with our projections for energy demand. Given that we are assuming economic growth
will average 2 percent per year, we first also assume that energy demand will also grow at a 2
percent average annual rate—i.e. that there will be no gains in energy efficiency as the Puerto
Rican economy grows. Under this scenario, as we see in row 2, total energy consumption rises
to 0.7 Q-BTUs by 2050. We then assume that energy consumption will grow at only 1 percent
per year over our 30-year period, with investments in energy efficiency cutting the growth rate of
energy consumption to be one-half the growth rate of the overall economy. We see that in row 3,
with energy consumption growing at 1 percent per year as opposed to 2 percent, overall energy
consumption as of 2050 will be 0.5 Q-BTUs as opposed to 0.7 Q-BTUs.
TABLE 4 BELONGS HERE
In other words, the Puerto Rican economy will now need to invest sufficiently in energy
efficiency measures to reduce the island’s energy consumption by 0.2 Q-BTUs as of 2050.
Since we are assuming that the costs of achieving 1 Q-BTU of efficiency gain will be $20
billion, it follows that Puerto Rico will need to spend a total of $4 billion over the 30-year
investment cycle. As an average over the 30-year period, this amounts to $133 million per year.
We next calculate the total costs of creating 0.5 Q-BTUs of clean renewable capacity in
Puerto Rico as of 2050 in order to supply 100 percent of the island’s energy demand through
clean renewables. As noted above, we are assuming that the average costs of building clean
renewable capacity in Puerto Rico will be $125 billion per Q-BTU. Under this assumption,
Puerto Rico will therefore need to spend a total of $63 billion as of 2050 to create this level of
renewable energy productive capacity. This amounts to $2.1 billion per year, as an average
investment spending level over the 30-year investment period.
We can now add up the total costs of this green growth investment program. As we see
in rows 8 and 9 of Table 4, these total costs are $67 billion for the full 30-year period, or $2.2
billion per year on average. This $2.2 billion average annual figure is equal to 1.6 percent of
Puerto Rico’s midpoint GDP in 2035 over the full 30-year investment period.
Job Creation
There will be two sources of net job creation as the Puerto Rican economy
pursues large-scale investments to both raise the economy’s level of energy efficiency
and to expand its supply of renewable energy. The first will be the jobs generated by the
energy efficiency and renewable investments themselves. The second will be the jobs
created through energy import substitution, with the economy’s spending on energy
imports declining steadily and those funds being redirected into the economy’s aggregate
spending stream. We consider these in turn, and present our results in Tables 5 and 6
respectively.
Job Creation through Clean Energy Investments
8
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We have worked with the input-output tables for Puerto Rico to derive these estimates.
From the input-output tables, we are able to generate employment/output ratios for investments
in both clean renewable energy and energy efficiency. We present the full derivation of these
employment/output ratios in the technical appendix. For both the renewable energy and energy
efficiency investments, the figures we present in Table 5 are weighted averages of
employment/output ratios for specific sets of activities in the Puerto Rico input/output tables.
For renewable energy, we assume investment shares as being 40 percent each for wind and solar
energy, 7 percent each for geothermal and low-emissions bioenergy and 6 percent for small-scale
hydro. With energy efficiency, we divide the full level of spending equally between building
retrofits, public transportation, industrial efficiency and electrical grid upgrades.
TABLE 5 BELONGS HERE
Based on these investment profiles, we then show in Table 5 the employment levels
generated by investing an average of $2.1 billion annually in renewable energy and $133 million
annually in energy efficiency. As we see first, in row 1, our estimate of job creation through
renewable energy investments in Puerto Rico is 10.4 jobs per $1 million in spending. Assuming
average spending is at $2.1 billion, this generates an average of about 21,800 new jobs per year
through renewable investments.
In row 3, we show that energy efficiency investments in Puerto Rico generate an average
of 12.5 jobs per $1 million in spending. Spending $133 million per year in these four energy
efficiency areas thus generates about 1,700 jobs per year.
Adding up the annual investments in both renewable energy and energy efficiency
respectively will therefore produce about 23,500 jobs within the existing productive processes, as
presented in the current input/output tables. We then also allow that production processes in all
areas of both energy efficiency and renewable energy production improve incrementally over
time, generating an annual gain in labor productivity of 1 percent per year. Because of this
steady improvement in labor productivity, the same $2.2 billion in clean energy investments will
then produce a reduced level of job creation as of 2050, i.e. 17,500 jobs in total, as opposed to
23,500 as of 2020.
Job Creation through Energy Import Substitution
As we show in Table 6, Puerto Rico’s average annual net energy import bill between
2011 – 2015 was $5.2 billion. Through the green growth program, we assume that these imports
will steadily decline to zero between 2020 – 2050. This pattern would imply a reduction in
imports of $174 million per year for the 30-year period. These are funds that we assume will be
redirected into Puerto Rico’s aggregate spending stream. We assume that this aggregate
spending stream will continue to include imports of products other than energy at their existing
levels.
TABLE 6 BELONGS HERE
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According to the Puerto Rico input/output tables, increasing spending in the aggregate
economy generates 11.3 jobs per $1 million of new spending. As we show in Table 6, this
means that, when $174 million is redirected away from import purchases and into the Puerto
Rican economy, about 1,700 jobs will be created. At the same time, the decline of Puerto Rico’s
energy imports will produce domestic job losses in activities tied to marketing and distributing
the island’s imported energy. The largest source of employment loss will be in the management
of retail gasoline stations. Overall, there are a total of about 5,400 people employed in Puerto
Rico’s fossil fuel marketing and distribution sectors. As the imported fossil fuel industry
steadily contracts, these jobs will also steadily contract. Over the 30-year transition period,
about 180 jobs per year will be lost in these fossil-fuel related marketing and distribution sectors.
Taking account of both the job increases through import substitution and the job losses
through contraction of the island’s fossil fuel marketing and distribution activities, the net impact
in 2020, the first year of the transitional program, will be about 1,800 jobs. But the net job
expansion will increase cumulatively over time, as imports decline steadily and as an increasing
level of funds are maintained within the Puerto Rican economy rather than lost through energy
imports. As such, by 2021, the net job expansion will increase to about 3,800 jobs by 2021 and
to 5,700 jobs by 2022. As we show in Table 6, the net job expansion rises to about 31,300 at the
2035 midpoint in the 30-year clean energy investment program, and to 61,000 by 2050,
assuming that labor productivity in the Puerto Rican economy remains constant over this 30-year
period. 11 But if we again assume that labor productivity will rise by an average of 1 percent per
year, then the net job expansion will be about 27,000 as of 2035 and 45,000 by 2050.
Considering now the total net job creation through both clean energy investments and
energy import substitution, we reach a figure of about 25,000 jobs in 2020, about 50,000 jobs in
2035 and between about 60,000 and 80,000 jobs as of 2050.
The full labor force in Puerto Rico is currently at 1.1 million. Moreover, this labor force
size reflects a historically low labor force participation rate of 40.0 percent. As recently as
2007, labor force participation was at nearly 50 percent. As such, net job creation in 2020 in the
range of 25,000 jobs—equal to about 2.3 percent of the current workforce—will have a
significant positive impact but will not be transformative in itself. Expanding employment by
25,000 jobs in today’s Puerto Rican economy would reduce the unemployment rate by about 2.5
percentage points, from 10 to 7.5 percent.
Moreover, this impact will grow with time, as the cumulative effects of import
substitution policies increase. As of 2035, with net job creation through both clean energy
investments and import substitution at around 50,000 jobs, this is likely to represent 4 – 5 percent
of Puerto Rico’s labor force at that time, after allowing for population changes and an increased
labor force participation rate. The impact will be greater still in 2050, with the total net job
creation in the range of 60,000 – 80,000, which will likely represent around 6 percent or more of
Puerto Rico’s labor force at that time.

11

In the technical appendix, we show our full results on employment creation through energy import
substitution. The figures we report in Table 6 provide a summary of our main results.
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Financing Green Growth
To address the question of how to reach the goal of an average clean energy investment
level of $2.2 billion per year, we first consider the prospects for establishing a carbon tax for the
Puerto Rican economy. We examine both the revenue potential of the tax and the distribution of
the revenue between three uses. These three uses are: 1) public investments and subsidies to
achieve the overall public and private investment level of $2.2 billion per year; 2) rebates to
lower-income households to minimize negative effects on living standards from the tax; and 3)
servicing outstanding government debts.
Revenue Potential from Carbon Tax
We examine the revenue potential of a carbon tax that begins at $25 per ton of CO2
emissions in 2020 and rises incrementally to $150 per ton as of 2050. These proposed tax rates
are based on models developed by both the U.S. Energy Department and the International
Energy Agency. 12 Our revenue estimates incorporate the key assumption of our overall green
growth framework, which is that the level of CO2 emissions in Puerto Rico will decline steadily
from its present level of 28 million tons to zero emissions as of 2050.
In Table 7, we show the results of these two assumptions—i.e. CO2 emissions declining
steadily from their current level of 28 million tons to zero emissions as of 2050, while the carbon
tax rises steadily from $25 to $150 per ton as fossil fuel consumption and emissions decline. As
the table shows, revenue begins in 2020 at $700 million, then rises up to $1.3 billion as of 2029.
The revenue then remains at that peak level until 2035, then starts declining gradually thereafter.
As we see, total revenue from the tax for all 30 years will be $28.9 billion. This averages to
$933 million per year over the full 30-year period.
TABLE 7 BELONGS HERE
Distributing revenue
As an initial working framework for distributing the carbon tax revenue, we propose that
the revenues be divided evenly between three purposes—i.e. on average, about $300 million per
year each could be used, respectively, for clean energy investments; rebates for lower-income
households; and debt servicing. How can such a framework be effective in achieving the goals
of advancing a sustainable and equitable growth path for Puerto Rico?
Investments. As noted above, the clean energy investment program would need to be
financed primarily through private investments, with public investments serving to attract private
investors and subsidize private investment costs. With an overall investment project scaled at
roughly $2.2 billion per year, having $300 million per year in public funding available means
that these public funds will need to leverage private investments at a ratio of roughly $1 in public
investments and subsidies incentivizing $7 in private investment. As we discuss below, this
level of leveraging is realistic, within both a broader framework policy measures established to
12

See discussions of the carbon taxes in Pollin et al. (2014) and Pollin et al. (2015).
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support private-sector clean energy investments, as well as global funding sources available to
support green growth initiatives.
Rebates. Establishing a carbon tax will exert upward pressure on retail prices for
fossil fuel energy. Indeed, this is one main purpose of the measure, with rising fossil fuel
prices serving to discourage consumption of fossil fuel energy and correspondingly
encourage the consumption of clean renewable energy. But this also creates a problem.
All else equal, the rise in fossil fuel prices generated by the carbon tax will lower the net
after tax incomes for the residents of Puerto Rico. In particular, it will disproportionately
lower the net incomes of lower income households, since these households spend a
higher share of their overall income on gasoline and electricity.
Focusing on gasoline prices, a rule-of-thumb for estimating the impact of a carbon
tax on retail prices is that every $1 dollar in a carbon tax will add about one cent to the
retail price per gallon of gasoline. Thus, starting the tax at $25 per ton will add about 25
cents to the price of a gallon gasoline in Puerto Rico. As we have seen, the current
average price of gasoline in San Juan is about $2.50 per gallon. The price increase due
to the carbon tax will therefore be around 10 percent with a $25 per ton tax. The highest
level for the tax, at $150 per ton, would therefore add about $1.50 to a gallon of gasoline.
At current retail gasoline prices, that would imply a 60 percent increase in gasoline
prices. But of course, by the time the tax would rise to $150 per ton in 2049, the Puerto
Rican economy will have almost completely transformed itself into a clean renewable
energy economy.
As of 2015, the median household in Puerto Rico spends about $4,000 per year on
energy, which amounts to about 20 percent of the median household income of $19,400.
Because the average household size is a bit less than 3 people, this implies that median
per capita spending on energy is $1,333. The 10 percent price increase resulting from
the initial carbon tax would therefore increase median per capita energy spending by
$133. The carbon tax would also put upward pressure on other retail prices in the
economy, as wholesale prices incorporate the energy cost increase at the business side of
the economy.
Considering these factors, the $300 million in rebates can be utilized as follows to
counteract the increases in living costs. If we allow that the $300 million per year in
rebates are divided equally among all Puerto Rican residents in the lower-half of the
income distribution, this would imply a $176 rebate for 1.7 million people. This level of
rebate should fully compensate those in the lower half of the income distribution for all
retail price increases resulting from the carbon tax. This is especially the case since these
lower-income households should also be benefitting from clean energy investments
becoming incorporated into the economy, such as expanded and less expensive public
transportation systems.
Under this proposal, the Puerto Ricans in the upper half of the income distribution
will have to absorb the energy price increases resulting from the carbon tax. At the same
time, higher-income residents are also better positioned to take advantage of the benefits
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that will become increasingly available through clean energy investments on the island.
For example, they will be able to more readily install solar panels on their rooftops,
greatly reducing, if not eliminating altogether, their level of electricity consumption
generated by fossil fuels. They will also be better able to purchase more energy efficient
automobiles, including hybrids and electric vehicles, as well as more efficient lighting
equipment and home appliances. Indeed, these initiatives will be a major factor
supporting the economy-wide clean energy transition.
Debt servicing. The government’s Fiscal Plan that was endorsed by the Oversight
Board last March is projected to generate total fiscal surpluses through 2026 of $7.9
billion. These are the funds that the Oversight Board proposes to channel into repaying
Puerto Rico’s creditors. But as we have discussed, the government aims to attain these
surpluses through enacting a severe austerity program, with large-scale cuts in health
care, education, and public employment overall. According to the Fiscal Plan’s own
projections, this program will not restore the economy to a positive growth trajectory
until 2024. This is almost certainly an optimistic scenario, since austerity will entail
losses of household income, business profits, and thus, government tax revenues.
The alternative we are proposing here is to devote $300 million per year from the
carbon tax revenue to debt servicing. Considered over a decade, the $3 billion that
would be available for debt servicing would amount to nearly 40 percent of the $7.9
billion that the Fiscal Plan claims is feasible through its austerity agenda. More
importantly, within the green growth framework, overall government revenues from all
sources will expand as a byproduct of the growing economy, as opposed to contracting as
a byproduct of a no-growth economy, operating under austerity.
Expanding Private Investments through Leveraging Public Funds
Puerto Rico does already have in place a range of policies that, at least on paper, provide
a starting framework for promoting private clean energy investments on a large scale. 13 These
include the following:
 Renewable energy and energy efficiency portfolio standards. These are regulatory
guidelines that establish goals for expanding renewable energy and raising efficiency
levels for utilities and other large-scale energy consumers. The renewable energy goal
was 12 percent of electric power supply by 2015, 15 percent by 2020 and 20 percent by
2035.
 Net metering. Net metering is the compensation arrangement between a utility and a
customer with an on-site generating system, typically a solar photovoltaic system. Net
metering gives the customer credit for power generation at the utility’s retail rate and
allows a customer to bank generation during hours or months when it exceeds the
customer’s consumption. Net metering is available in Puerto Rico for residential
customers for up to 25 kilowatts and other systems up to 1 megawatt. These are
13

Energy Transition Initiative, “Energy Snapshot: Puerto Rico,”
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62708.pdf
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generous terms. As a comparison point, the average residential photovoltaic system in
the United States is 5 kilowatts.
 Public loans/grants/tax incentives. The Puerto Rico Green Energy Incentives Act of
2010 created the Green Energy Fund. Under this fund, the government committed to coinvest up to $185 million in the development in renewable energy projects. It also
offers tax rebates in the range of 40 – 50 percent for private investment projects.
However, the fund started with only $20 million in total funding in 2011.
While these measures should be effective in advancing clean energy investments in Puerto
Rico, especially operating in combination, the reality is that, to date, progress has been modest.
Thus, though the goal for renewable energy-generated electricity was 12 percent as of 2015, in
fact, renewables supplied only about 2 percent of the energy for electricity generation in 2015.
The island will also certainly not reach its next established goal of 15 percent renewable
electricity as of 2020.
The point here is that with funding available through the carbon tax in the range of $300
million per year, these policies could be capable of growing to a scale that could make them
effective. Within such an effective policy environment, it would then be reasonable to expect
that Puerto Rico could leverage $300 million a year in public funds to generate a total of around
$2 billion per year in private clean energy investments.
As a case in point, the U.S. Energy Department’s renewable energy loan guarantee program
under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—i.e. the Obama stimulus program—
helped underwrite about $14 billion in new renewable energy investments between 2009 – 2013.
Total losses from this program that the government had to guarantee amounted to about $300
million, i.e. equal to about 2.1 percent of the $14 billion in new loans for clean energy
investments that the government guaranteed. This means that the leverage rate for the loan
guarantee program was about $47 in additional clean energy investments underwritten by $1 of
federal support. 14
Given both that Puerto Rico has been in an economic slump for a decade and that the clean
energy industry on the island is still in its infancy, one cannot realistically expect this investment
incentive program to achieve a leverage ratio anything close to the 47/1 ratio that was reached
under the Obama-era loan guarantee program. But it is realistic to expect that, through the
effective execution of clean energy policies already in place, in combination with the $300
million in annual funding from the carbon tax revenues, Puerto Rico could reach a leveraging
ratio of 7/1—i.e. approximately one-seventh as large as that attained through the Obama loanguarantee program. In short, under an effective policy environment, Puerto Rico could
realistically expect to generate in the range of $2 billion per year in private clean energy
investments through providing $300 million in public investments as well as incentives, loans,
and loan guarantees for private investors.
Prospects for Alternative Ownership Forms

14

This program is discussed in Pollin et al. (2014), pp. 260 – 263.
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The green growth program for Puerto Rico will open up a wide range of
opportunities for new business ventures to support the economy’s clean energy transition.
In fact, throughout the world, the energy sector has long operated under a variety of
ownership structures, including public/municipal ownership, and various forms of private
cooperative ownership in addition to private corporate entities. The alternative ownership
forms operate in all areas of the energy industry, including both the fossil fuel and
renewable sectors.
Indeed, in the oil and natural gas industry, publicly owned national companies
control approximately 90 percent of the world’s reserves and 75 percent of production.
They also control many of the oil and gas infrastructure systems. These national
corporations include Saudi Aramco, Gazprom in Russia, China National Petroleum
Corporation, the National Iranian Oil Company, Petroleos deVenezuela, Petrobras in
Brazil, and Petronas in Malaysia.
At the same time, the development of clean energy systems has already opened up
opportunities for smaller-scale enterprises, which have been organized through various
combinations of public, private and cooperative ownership structures. The European
industry, in particular, operates with a high proportion of private cooperative ownership
forms. The performance of these non-corporate private business enterprises has generally
been quite favorable relative to the traditional corporate firms. One area where this has
been clear is community-based wind farms in Western Europe, especially Germany,
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Mark Bolinger at the U.S. Department of Energy, along with other researchers,
has highlighted four important advantages to community ownership structures in the
wind industry over traditional corporate ownership. 15 These include:
1.

Acceptance of lower rates of profit. Community-based wind projects in Europe have been
able to rely on a wide array of relatively small-scale local investors, whose profit
requirements are lower than those of private corporations. This in turn means that the costs of
expanding wind power capacity will fall, promoting a more rapid expansion in new
investments.
2. Increased public support. Direct community ownership of wind projects has raised public
awareness in Europe and increased the number of local people who have direct financial
stakes in such projects. This has reduced community resistance to projects at the planning
and permitting stages.
3. Potential for lower electricity transmission costs. The relatively small size of communityowned projects enables them to be more easily located within, or nearby, the communities
themselves. This makes possible significant reductions in the costs of transmitting energy
over the grid.
4. Electricity price stability. Community-owned wind projects operate at arms-length from the
two forces that are most responsible for creating instability in electricity prices: the global
market for oil and the speculative commodities futures market for energy, including
15
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electricity. Because, by their basic ownership structure, community-based wind projects will
continue to operate independently of the global price of oil as well as the commodities
futures markets, this should create long-term conditions supportive of electricity price
stability.
Community-based energy projects do also come with disadvantages. The most
significant is that because community-owned projects will tend to be smaller in scale than
corporate-owned operations, they are not as well equipped to spread the costs of any
given project, including permitting and legal costs and the full range of construction and
transmission costs. On balance though, for a small island economy such as Puerto Rico,
the relative benefits attainable through economies of scale will be more modest than in a
larger economy setting. Moreover, as one aspect of prioritizing a green growth program,
the Puerto Rican government can commit to minimizing the regulatory burdens
associated with advancing clean energy investment projects.
The development of affordable renewable energy is also, increasingly, creating
realistic prospects for private individuals, businesses, and small-scale community
organizations to own their own renewable energy supplies. In some cases, these systems
operate entirely separate from the electric utility grid. These distributed energy supply
systems are powered by solar, wind, and other renewable sources. The prospects for
individual household ownership of solar panels, in particular, are quite favorable in
Puerto Rico, given the island’s year-round sunny climate.
Conclusion
Economic crises often create opportunities for transformational change. Puerto
Rico has clearly arrived at just such an historical juncture. Continuing to proceed along
its current austerity path—or an even more severe version of austerity, if its creditors
prevail in the ongoing debt negotiations—offers a dead end of further economic
contraction, out-migration and declining average living standards. It also creates
overwhelming obstacles to successfully implementing any kind of viable structural
reforms of the economy, including the structural reforms proposed in the government’s
Fiscal Plan and approved by the U.S. Oversight Board.
But Puerto Rico also has an opportunity to pursue transformational structural
reform through a green growth path. As we have shown, green growth offers Puerto Rico
the opportunity to create a sustainable independent economy as opposed to recreating the
type of dependent relationship that prevailed through the Section 936 framework of U.S.
corporate giveaways. Under the green growth path, Puerto Rico can produce a viable
domestic energy infrastructure, capable of slashing the price of electricity on the island,
from about 20 cents to 4 – 7 cents per kilowatt hour. Building a domestic energy
infrastructure will also free the island from having to ship out 4 – 6 percent of its GDP
every year to purchase imported petroleum and natural gas.
The investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy on the island will
produce a large-scale expansion in job opportunities, with new job creation growing from
16
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about 25,000 per year to as high as 80,000 as investment projects continue between 2020
– 2050 and as imported energy purchases steadily decline. Building a domestic clean
energy infrastructure will also create widespread opportunities for new business ventures,
including small-scale community-owned and cooperative enterprises. By committing
itself to embracing the global climate stabilization project through steadily driving down
CO2 emissions to zero as of 2050, Puerto Rico will also enhance its reputation as a
desirable tourist destination.
Still, this green growth project cannot launch successfully under anything close to
the austerity conditions now prevailing on the island. Puerto Rico’s creditors simply
have to accept the fact that major debt write-downs are necessary. The options facing
Puerto Rico at present are therefore clear. One option is to accept deepening economic
and social decline within a framework of ongoing austerity policies. Another option, as
we have shown, is to begin building a viable independent economy within the framework
of green growth.
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Technical Appendix
Estimating the Employment Effects from Clean Energy Investments
The employment multipliers for each of the energy categories studied in this paper have
been constructed through an input-output, or commonly known as I-O, model. This methodology
of calculating the employment multipliers had also been previously employed in a study of the
U.S. economy (Pollin et.al 2014) and other developing countries like Indonesia and India (Pollin
et. al. 2015, Pollin and Chakraborty (2015a)). Input-Output models estimate the economy-wide
and sectoral impact on the output, employment, and value added of changes in the final demand
for goods and services produced by a sector or combination of sectors. The limitations and the
advantages of using the I-O model over other similar models like Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) have been discussed earlier, in great lengths, in Pollin et. al (2014).
One challenge with using the I-O models to evaluate the employment multiplier effects
through expenditure on clean energy investments is that the renewable energy sectors like solar,
wind, bioenergy, and related other sectors do not occur in the I-O models. Since the I-O family of
models is structured using the sector as the building block, it poses a significant challenge. To
overcome this challenge, we pursue the approach of using the real sectors in the I-O model to
construct a synthetic sector, which reflects the composition of industrial activities associated with
the activity in question. We document here, in detail in Table A1, the relative weights used to
construct these various synthetic energy sectors.
TABLE A1 BELONGS HERE
Spending on the clean energy program, as with every other activity in the economy,
creates jobs through three channels: direct, indirect and induced. I-O models are instrumental in
documenting the indirect and induced employment that a current level of productive activity
supports. Suppose, these three effects of investments in home retrofitting and building wind
turbines can be described in the following manner:
•
•
•

Direct Effects: the jobs created by retrofitting homes to make them more energy
efficient or by building wind turbines to generate electricity
Indirect Effects: the jobs associated with the industries that supply intermediate
goods for the building retrofits or wind turbines, such as lumber, steel, and
transportation.
Induced Effects: The expansion of employment that results when people employed in
the construction or steel industries or the truck drivers spend the money they have
earned from producing these immediate and intermediate goods on other products in
the economy like food, clothing, and other everyday expenditures.

For each energy sector, the approach in this paper has been to assign weights on each
sector based on the earlier studies done by Pollin et. al (2014) and Pollin et. al. (2015).The
justification of these weights for the various clean energy sectors in these previous studies had
been based on the identification of a source document or a set of source documents which
contained detailed cost information for the equipment and installation costs of the concerned
technology. Next, those cost structures were mapped into the industrial categories within the I-O
model. These categories include industries such as hardware manufacturing, capacitor, resistor
and other inductor manufacturing, concrete pipe manufacturing, and so on.
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In this paper, we have used the IMPLAN 3 software with the IMPLAN 2015 database for
the Puerto Rico economy compiled by the Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. This database is an
exhaustive set of data which provides 526 industry level details. The IMPLAN database based on
the I-O model allows us to observe relationships between different industries in the production of
goods and services. It further allows in observing relationships between consumers of goods and
services, including households and governments, and the various other manufacturing industries.
The I-O modelling approach enables us to estimate the effects on employment resulting from an
increase in the final demand for the products of a given industry. For example, we can estimate
the number of jobs directly created in the construction industry for each $1 million of spending on
building weatherization. We can also estimate the jobs that are also indirectly generated in other
industries through the $1 million of the expenses on building weatherization – industries such as
insulation, windows, and hardware. Overall, the I-O model allows us to estimate the economywide employment results from a given level of spending in any one industry or combination of
industries. Table A.1 gives the details of the weights used to construct each of the renewable and
energy efficient sectors within the I-O models from the IMPLAN database of Puerto Rico for our
employment estimates.
The total employment multipliers generated along with the figures for direct, indirect and
induced employments, in each energy sector using the various weights are calculated and given in
Table A2.
TABLE A2 BELONGS HERE
Jobs Creation through Energy Import Substitution
The IMPLAN database contains industry-based figures of various industries for the
economy of Puerto Rico. Using the IMPLAN database and aggregating the employment figures
for various industries associated with the fossil fuel sector, like natural gas distribution, gasoline
retail stores, pipeline transportation, and so on, we estimate that the total employment figures
related to the fossil fuel sector stand at 5364. We assume that with the contraction of the fossil
fuel industry, these jobs will diminish over a period of 30 years at an annual average of 179 jobs
per year. Since the annual average energy trade balance of the Puerto Rico economy is 5.23
billion dollars, which slowly reduces to 0 until 2050, we assume that there is an annual average
decline of the fossil fuel import bill by 174.3 million dollars. From the IMPLAN database, we
estimated that the Puerto Rico economy generates 11.3 jobs in the domestic economy per million
dollars of investment. It implies that with an annual savings and reinvestment of 174.3 million
dollars, the Puerto Rico economy can generate 1969 jobs annually through import substitution. In
net terms, it means that the net jobs created in 2020 will be around 1790 jobs. Since the number
of jobs created will accumulate over the years and considering the number of jobs lost through
contraction of the fossil fuel industry, the Puerto Rico economy will experience a net generation
of employment to the level of 61,034 by 2050 through import substitution of fossil fuel energy.
We show the full annual time series of net job creation through energy import substitution in
Table A3.
TABLE A3 BELONGS HERE
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Table 1.
Comparative Energy Prices for Puerto Rico and U.S. Mainland
Gasoline and electricity prices, 2017
Puerto Rico

US Average

Puerto Rico relative
to U.S.

$2.50,
(in San Juan)

$2.40

+4.2%

20.1 cents
22.1 cents
18.2 cents
Source: https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=RQ;

12.7 cents
10.4 cents
6.6 cents

+ 58.0%
+112.7%
+275.1%

Gasoline per gallon,
2017
Electricity per kilowatt
hour, 2017
-- Residential
-- Commercial
-- Industrial

Average Projected U.S. Renewable Energy Electricity Prices, 2022
U.S. Average,
per kilowatt hour

Onshore wind
Solar PV
Geothermal
Source: https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/electricity_generation.php

Current Puerto Rico
residential relative to 2022
U.S. renewable average
5.6 cents
7.4 cents
4.4 cents

+357.1%
+270.2%
+454.5%

Table 2.
Puerto Rico Net Energy Imports and GDP, 2011 – 2015
Net Energy Imports

Net Energy Imports
as share of GDP

$4.4 billion
4.4%
$6.3 billion
6.3%
$6.1 billion
5.9%
$5.5 billion
5.4%
$3.7 billion
3.6%
Source: Trade data from U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division; GDP data
from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators and
https://tradingeconomics.com/puerto-rico/gdp

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Table 3.
Basic Data and Assumptions of Puerto Rico Green Growth Framework
GDP, 2020 – 2050
1. GDP, 2015 actual and 2020 projected

$103 billion

2. Average annual GDP Growth, 2020 –
2050
3. Midpoint GDP—2035

2%
$140 billion

4. Endpoint GDP—2050

$185 billion

Energy Consumption and Emissions
5. Energy consumption, 2014

0.38 Q-BTUs

6. CO2 emissions, 2014

28 million tons

Estimated Average Costs for Clean Energy Investments
7. Average costs for increasing energy
efficiency

$20 billion per Q-BTU of energy savings

8. Average costs for expanding clean
renewable energy supply

$125 billion per Q-BTU of energy supply

Sources: http://data.worldbank.org/country/puerto-rico; https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=RQ;
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=0040000010000000000000000200000001&c=0
0000000000000000000000000000000000002&ct=0&vs=INTL.44-1-PRIQBTU.A&vo=0&v=H&start=1980&end=2014; Pollin et al. (2015)

Table 4.
Impact of Clean Energy Investments on Energy Demand and Supply
Energy Efficiency Investments and Energy Demand
1. Energy consumption, 2014 actual
2. 2050 Energy Consumption with 2%
average annual consumption growth
3. 2050 energy consumption with 1%
consumption growth
4. Total costs of reducing 2050 energy
consumption by 0.2 Q-BTUs
5. Average annual 2020 – 2050 costs of
reducing 2050 energy consumption by 0.2
Q-BTUs

0.38 Q-BTUs
0.7 Q-BTUs
0.5 Q-BTUs
$4 billion
((= row 2 – row 3) x $20 billion)

$133 million
(= row 4/30)

Renewable Energy Investments and Energy Supply
6. Investment costs to build 0.5 Q-BTUs
of renewable energy capacity
7. Average annual 2020 - 2050 costs of
building 0.5 Q-BTUs of renewable
capacity by 2050

$63 billion
(= $125 billion x 0.5)

$2.1 billion

Overall Investment Costs and GDP

8. Total clean energy investment costs

$67 billion
(= rows 4 = 6)

9. Average annual investment costs

$2.2 billion
(= rows 5 + 7)

10. Average annual costs as pct. of
2035 GDP
Sources: https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=RQ; Table 1 figures.

1.6%
(= row 9/$140 billion)

Table 5.
Employment Creation through Clean Energy Investments
Renewable Investments, 2020
1.Job creation per $1 million in
investments
2. Job creation through $2.1 billion in
investments
Energy Efficiency Investments, 2020

10.4 jobs
21,800 jobs
(= 10.4 x 2,100)

3. Job creation per $1 million in
investments
4. Job creation through $133 million in
investments

1,700 jobs
(= 12.5 x 133)

5. Total Job Creation through Clean
Energy Investments, 2020

23,500 jobs
(= rows 4+5)

11. Total Job Creation, 2050, with 1%
average annual labor productivity
growth
Sources: See technical appendix.

12.5 jobs

17,500 jobs

Table 6.
Job Creation through Energy Import Substitution
Basic Data
$5.2 billion

Average annual energy import bill, 2011 – 2015
Average reduction per year in energy import bill,
2020 – 2050
Job creation per $1 million through aggregate
spending
Job losses per year through contraction of
imported energy marketing and distribution

$173 million
(= $5.2 billion/30)
11.3 jobs per million

180 jobs per year

Net Employment Creation, 2020 - 2050
Job creation with existing
employment/output ratios

Job creation with 1% average
annual labor productivity
growth

Job creation in 2020

1,800

1,800

Job creation in 2035

31,300

27,000

Job creation in 2050

61,000

45,000

Sources: See technical appendix for sources and detailed calculations. Figures reported here are rounded.

Table 7. Revenue from Carbon Tax
Proposed tax rate rises from $25 - $150 per ton between 2020 - 2049

Year
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050

Emissions (million

Carbon tax rate

metric tons)

(Dollars/ton)

28.0
27.1
26.1
25.2
24.3
23.3
22.4
21.5
20.5
19.6
18.7
17.7
16.8
15.9
14.9
14.0
13.1
12.1
11.2
10.3
9.3
8.4
7.5
6.5
5.6
4.7
3.7
2.8
1.9
0.9
0.0

$25.0
$29.3
$33.6
$37.9
$42.2
$46.6
$50.9
$55.2
$59.5
$63.8
$68.1
$72.4
$76.7
$81.0
$85.3
$89.7
$94.0
$98.3
$102.6
$106.9
$111.2
$115.5
$119.8
$124.1
$128.4
$132.8
$137.1
$141.4
$145.7
$150.0
0.0

Total
Annual Average
Sources: Projections based on program to reduce emissions incrementally to zero by 2050.

Revenue
$700 million
$793 million
$879 million
$956 million
$1.0 billion
$1.1 billion
$1.1 billion
$1.2 billion
$1.2 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$1.2 billion
$1.2 billion
$1.2 billion
$1.1 billion
$1.0 billion
$970 million
$895 million
$811 million
$719 million
$620 million
$512 million
$396 million
$272 million
$140 million
--

$28.9 billion
$933 million

Table A1: Weighting Assumptions for Specifying Clean Energy within Puerto Rico’s
Input/Output Model
Category

Bioenergy

Solar PV

Hydro -Small

Wind

Geothermal

Weatherization

Industrial Energy Efficiency

Smart Grids

Public Transport

I-O Industry (based on IMPLAN)
Grain farming
Support activities for agriculture and forestry
Construction of other new non-residential
structures
Petroleum refineries
Scientific research and development services
Construction of new power and communication
structures
Hardware manufacturing
All other industrial machinery manufacturing
Capacitor, resistor, coil, transformer, and other
inductor manufacturing
Marketing research and all other miscellaneous
professional, scientific and technical services
Construction of other new non-residential
structures
Concrete pipe manufacturing
Machine tool manufacturing
All other industrial machinery manufacturing
Other communication and energy wire
manufacturing
Architectural, engineering, and related services
Construction of new power and communication
structures
Plastic material and resin manufacturing
Fabricated structural metal manufacturing
All other industrial machinery manufacturing
Marketing research and all other miscellaneous
professional, scientific and technical services
Other chemical and fertilizer mineral mining
Construction of other new non-residential
structures
Other communications equipment manufacturing
Scientific research and development services
Maintenance and repair construction of
residential structures
Maintenance and repair construction of
nonresidential structures
Heating (except warm air furnaces) equipment
manufacturing
Air conditioning, refrigeration, and warm air
heating equipment manufacturing
All other industrial machinery manufacturing
Environmental and other technical consulting
services
Maintenance and repair construction of
nonresidential structures
Construction of other new nonresidential
structures
Mechanical power transmission equipment
manufacturing
All other miscellaneous electrical equipment and
component manufacturing
Other electronic component manufacturing
Construction of other new nonresidential
structures

Weights
25%
25%
25%
12.5%
12.5%
30.0%
17.5%
17.5%
17.5%
17.5%
50.0%
10.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
10.0%
26.0%
12.0%
12.0%
43.0%
7.0%
15.0%
45.0%
10.0%
30.0%
50.0%
50.0%
10.0%
10.0%
30.0%
30.0%
20.0%
25.0%
25.0%
25.0%
25.0%
30.0%

Renewable Energy

Motor vehicle body manufacturing
Motor vehicle electrical and electronic
equipment manufacturing
Motor vehicle steering, suspension component
(except spring) and brake systems manufacturing
Motor vehicle seating and interior trim
manufacturing
Other motor vehicles part manufacturing
Ship building and repairing
Transit and ground passenger transportation
Water transportation
Scenic and sight seeing transportation and
support activities for transportation
Wind and Solar
Geothermal and bioenergy

Hydro-Small
Smart grids and grid upgrades, public transport,
industrial energy efficiency and building
weatherization and retrofitting.
Source: Authors’estimations of weights based on Pollin et. al. (2014) and Pollin et. al. (2015)
Energy Efficiency

3.4%
3.3%
4.3%
0.5%
8.2%
3.0%
43.0%
3.0%
1.3%
40 percent
each
7 percent
each
6 percent
25 percent
each

Table A2. Employment Multipliers Generated in Puerto Rico’s Clean Energy Sector
Figures are Jobs created per $1 million in Expenditure
Clean Energy
Program

Sectors

Direct Effect

Indirect Effect

Induced Effect

Total Effect

Wind

5.1

1.6

2.2

8.8

Solar

5.9

1.5

2.9

10.3

Hydro-Small

7.5

1.6

2.9

12.0

Bioenergy

11.4

1.2

3.5

16.0

Geothermal

8.1

1.6

3.3

13.0

Smart Grids

3.5

0.8

1.4

5.7

11.1

1.6

3.6

16.3

8.0

1.5

3.9

13.4

Weatherization
9.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Table A1 figures.

2.4

3.3

14.7

Renewable
Energy

Energy
Efficiency

Public Transport
Industrial EE

Table A.3: Annual Job Creation Estimates through Puerto Rico Energy Import
Substitution, 2020 - 2050

Employment generated due
to Import Substitution

Year

Jobs lost due to Fossil
Fuel Industry

Net jobs

2020

1,969

179

1,790

2021

3,938

179

3,759

2022

5,907

179

5,728

2023

7,875

179

7,697

2024

9,844

179

9,665

2025

11,813

179

11,634

2026

13,782

179

13,603

2027

15,751

179

15,572

2028

17,720

179

17,541

2029

19,688

179

19,510

2030

21,657

179

21,478

2031

23,626

179

23,447

2032

25,595

179

25,416

2033

27,564

179

27,385

2034

29,533

179

29,354

2035

31,501

179

31,323

2036

33,470

179

33,292

2037

35,439

179

35,260

2038

37,408

179

37,229

2039

39,377

179

39,198

2040

41,346

179

41,167

2041

43,315

179

43,136

2042

45,283

179

45,105

2043

47,252

179

47,073

2044

49,221

179

49,042

2045

51,190

179

51,011

2046

53,159

179

52,980

2047

55,128

179

54,949

2048

57,096

179

56,918

2049

59,065

179

58,886

2050

61,034

0

61,034

Annual Average
31,501
Source: Authors’ estimations based on IMPLAN database.

173

31,328

